WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:10.000 Music. 00:00:10.094 --> 00:00:14.434 And welcome to The Edition podcast. I'm your host Charlotte Henry. 00:00:15.294 --> 00:00:19.874 This week I'm going to do a strange thing which is tell you to listen to another podcast. 00:00:20.234 --> 00:00:23.674 I'm joined by Carl Miller who is a fellow at Demos, the think tank here in the 00:00:23.674 --> 00:00:28.674 UK, but also the host and one of the writers on the most brilliant podcast that 00:00:28.674 --> 00:00:30.954 I'm listening to which is called Kill This. 00:00:31.454 --> 00:00:34.414 Hello Carl, how are you? Hi Charlotte, yeah good, not bad. 00:00:35.114 --> 00:00:37.894 Good, I'm pleased to hear it after what I've been listening on your 00:00:37.894 --> 00:00:40.694 podcast I guess well let's 00:00:40.694 --> 00:00:44.634 just start at the beginning first we'll tell people a little bit about your career just 00:00:44.634 --> 00:00:48.774 who for some people who haven't encountered your work yet very long 00:00:48.774 --> 00:00:51.534 in the tooth think tanker um kind of 00:00:51.534 --> 00:00:54.514 researcher recovering academic um spent 00:00:54.514 --> 00:00:58.494 most of my career looking at tech and being interested in the kind of mysteries 00:00:58.494 --> 00:01:04.334 that technology can sometimes create um wrote a book about all of that in 2018 00:01:04.334 --> 00:01:07.954 called the death of the gods which was looking at kind of how power was changing 00:01:07.954 --> 00:01:12.514 the digital age across like business and politics and and crime and, 00:01:13.154 --> 00:01:15.914 really kind of have spent most of my time thinking about tech but 00:01:15.914 --> 00:01:18.914 in this kind of quite general kind of ideas driven way 00:01:18.914 --> 00:01:21.674 and absolutely not in the way that I 00:01:21.674 --> 00:01:24.954 ended up having to deal with technology and people using technology 00:01:24.954 --> 00:01:27.874 in certain ways during Kill List which was yes much more 00:01:27.874 --> 00:01:30.694 tangible it certainly was yes you're not 00:01:30.694 --> 00:01:34.014 the type of tech researcher that does kind of product 00:01:34.014 --> 00:01:38.334 reviews or things like that you've been looking at it and the sort of societal 00:01:38.334 --> 00:01:44.094 impacts and those kind of developments which does bring us to kill list which 00:01:44.094 --> 00:01:48.934 is you told me is an 18 part uh series i'm up i'm halfway through season four 00:01:48.934 --> 00:01:51.294 and let's just get it out there i'm completely obsessed. 00:01:52.234 --> 00:01:56.194 Um it's one of the best put together podcasts i've ever listened to it's it's 00:01:56.194 --> 00:02:00.894 beautifully done give particularly given the subject matter so i guess let's 00:02:00.894 --> 00:02:06.794 let's dive into it how did it all begin I mean the title obviously gives away 00:02:06.794 --> 00:02:11.934 that you found this quote-unquote kill list but how did that begin. 00:02:13.146 --> 00:02:16.366 It began in 2020 um a 00:02:16.366 --> 00:02:19.346 hacker that i knew called chris montero he 00:02:19.346 --> 00:02:24.306 was probing around the dark net as you 00:02:24.306 --> 00:02:27.046 do in the pandemic as you do in the pandemic you know 00:02:27.046 --> 00:02:30.166 he is a dot net kind of researcher i suppose so 00:02:30.166 --> 00:02:33.346 you know he he's kind of it's it's part of his um 00:02:33.346 --> 00:02:36.166 kind of interest or job to kind of keep track of what's happening in 00:02:36.166 --> 00:02:39.006 the dark net sites that are emerging sites that are closing 00:02:39.006 --> 00:02:41.966 down um and um i first 00:02:41.966 --> 00:02:44.826 got to know him actually when i was writing death of the gods because 00:02:44.826 --> 00:02:47.886 he was one of these people that um could i thought 00:02:47.886 --> 00:02:50.806 could bring me closer to the realities of how 00:02:50.806 --> 00:02:56.806 power was changing when it came to law enforcement and crime um and um it was 00:02:56.806 --> 00:03:03.666 kind of march april 2020 lovely and and not only had chris kind of found these 00:03:03.666 --> 00:03:07.566 assassination sites on the darknet that were kind of claiming to be basically 00:03:07.566 --> 00:03:09.386 the digital shopfronts for the mafia. 00:03:10.366 --> 00:03:13.826 But then fatefully he found 00:03:13.826 --> 00:03:18.626 this little vulnerability in the way that these sites worked and that allowed 00:03:18.626 --> 00:03:23.786 him to kind of wiggle through this kind of small digital gap so to speak and 00:03:23.786 --> 00:03:29.386 find himself in the middle of the marketplace in the middle of the site and 00:03:29.386 --> 00:03:31.966 that allowed him and therefore me and Caroline, 00:03:32.146 --> 00:03:38.706 my producer, to kind of see the live kill orders that people were using this site to make. 00:03:39.346 --> 00:03:42.966 This is no spoiler, by the way. You reveal this very early on in the show. 00:03:43.126 --> 00:03:45.546 So not only could Chris... 00:03:46.554 --> 00:03:51.894 To access the website, he could actually see the orders coming in live as if 00:03:51.894 --> 00:03:57.234 they were ordering their shopping on a supermarket website, and how much money, 00:03:57.494 --> 00:04:02.034 in this case, obviously, in Bitcoin, people were prepared to pay to have someone killed. 00:04:02.454 --> 00:04:05.594 That's right. And there's a big difference between those two things. 00:04:05.694 --> 00:04:10.094 So the site itself is no secret. In fact, it ultimately advertises itself. 00:04:10.894 --> 00:04:14.234 Hence why people know how to make the payments and take out the orders. 00:04:14.234 --> 00:04:21.014 I mean, Jura, who perhaps we'll talk about the kind of shadowy Romanian cyber criminal that runs it, 00:04:21.254 --> 00:04:27.794 he'd gone to quite great lengths in order to actually try and entice people 00:04:27.794 --> 00:04:30.314 to it. So he was really trying to build its brand. 00:04:30.594 --> 00:04:36.534 So the site wasn't a secret, but all the kill orders were being sent by people 00:04:36.534 --> 00:04:39.774 that were absolutely convinced that they were being sent in secret. 00:04:40.174 --> 00:04:43.194 And so this isn't a forum. It's not a kind of public discussion. 00:04:43.194 --> 00:04:45.514 And I think some people might think of the site like that. It's not. 00:04:46.534 --> 00:04:51.474 When you log into the site, you are basically filling out various kinds of order 00:04:51.474 --> 00:04:56.014 forms that you believe are going directly to the kind of mafia kingpins running 00:04:56.014 --> 00:04:57.274 the site. That's what you think is happening. 00:04:57.914 --> 00:05:03.154 Yeah, this is not like a subreddit where you can read what everyone else is putting in. 00:05:03.514 --> 00:05:10.094 No, no. You're filling this out to make an entirely, you believe, an entirely anonymous, 00:05:10.874 --> 00:05:14.074 entirely secret order where you're filling out name, address, 00:05:14.514 --> 00:05:18.714 you're uploading photos, you're providing pattern of life, you're ultimately 00:05:18.714 --> 00:05:20.014 providing a Bitcoin payment. 00:05:20.314 --> 00:05:26.274 And those things you believe are being bundled together into a package of information 00:05:26.274 --> 00:05:29.634 that's going to send out a hitman in order to actually kill that person. 00:05:29.874 --> 00:05:34.974 Now, you've said a couple of times that people believe this. 00:05:35.414 --> 00:05:39.994 I'm trying to avoid spoilers, but we do have to say for the context of the rest of our conversation, 00:05:40.194 --> 00:05:43.174 it emerges pretty early on in your series that this 00:05:43.174 --> 00:05:47.034 website itself is a scam i.e if 00:05:47.034 --> 00:05:50.594 you're paying x number of bitcoin or part of bitcoin to 00:05:50.594 --> 00:05:53.574 this euro figure he is not actually getting 00:05:53.574 --> 00:05:58.434 hit men to do this job that is a scam however that as we quickly learned from 00:05:58.434 --> 00:06:03.314 you is not really the point because what you have proved indisputably is there 00:06:03.314 --> 00:06:07.614 are people out there who are very serious and prepared had to pay serious sums 00:06:07.614 --> 00:06:11.434 of money because they were very genuinely want someone killed. 00:06:12.274 --> 00:06:16.614 Yeah, those two realisations came bundled together as soon as we could see the messages. 00:06:17.531 --> 00:06:23.591 If these were real hitmen, they were the most incompetent hitmen you would ever believe. 00:06:23.931 --> 00:06:27.411 I mean, they kept getting lost. They kept losing their guns. 00:06:27.731 --> 00:06:32.911 The target was too well protected. Every single time we could trace these discussions, 00:06:32.911 --> 00:06:38.671 they would always lead to a failure, an attempt by the site's administrator 00:06:38.671 --> 00:06:41.971 to try and extort more money from the perpetrator. 00:06:42.131 --> 00:06:45.491 So they need to send a better trained team. They need to buy a new weapon. 00:06:45.491 --> 00:06:50.191 They need to fund more plane tickets because the target had moved to a different 00:06:50.191 --> 00:06:51.731 country every single time. 00:06:52.151 --> 00:06:57.411 So we could see that that was true. But then also we could see in these messages, 00:06:57.951 --> 00:07:00.611 page after page of like sustained, 00:07:01.231 --> 00:07:07.851 kind of determined kind of discussion where the person really was trying to have someone killed. 00:07:07.851 --> 00:07:11.931 And that seemed deadly serious to us. 00:07:11.931 --> 00:07:17.011 So from the very beginning, really, and kind of this sets up the next kind of two years of my life, 00:07:17.291 --> 00:07:23.251 you know, we we really are mainly being worried about the people actually loading 00:07:23.251 --> 00:07:26.911 the people onto the site and what else they might be doing or might be willing 00:07:26.911 --> 00:07:28.711 to do in order to have these people killed. 00:07:29.551 --> 00:07:32.991 And ultimately, that could be they might be prepared to do the killing themselves. 00:07:33.931 --> 00:07:36.451 Yes. And that was one of the first cases that we encountered. 00:07:36.451 --> 00:07:45.171 So finally, you know, we were, after much rigmarole, reaching some people on the kill list. 00:07:45.251 --> 00:07:50.211 We kind of undertook, we undertook ourselves to really try and warn people when 00:07:50.211 --> 00:07:53.551 we became convinced the police weren't going to be doing that themselves. 00:07:54.411 --> 00:08:02.091 Or quickly enough. Funnily enough, yeah. And we, we reach a woman called Elena in Switzerland. 00:08:03.111 --> 00:08:09.271 And uh elena um took it incredibly well actually can i just say i was listening 00:08:09.271 --> 00:08:12.771 to this having a lovely walk in the park and i hear this and, 00:08:13.894 --> 00:08:16.934 There's a whole load of stuff around the journalistic ethics and practice that 00:08:16.934 --> 00:08:21.294 I really do want to talk to you about. But a lot of that comes up in this first call. 00:08:22.034 --> 00:08:27.354 First of all, Carl, you are a very talented researcher and journalist. 00:08:27.554 --> 00:08:29.974 You're not great at cold calls, are you, mate? 00:08:30.694 --> 00:08:33.994 No, no, I was awful. I was absolutely awful. 00:08:35.654 --> 00:08:39.614 I'm not very good on the phone anyway, so I definitely shoulder some of the 00:08:39.614 --> 00:08:40.554 responsibility myself. 00:08:40.554 --> 00:08:43.714 But but also partly i mean 00:08:43.714 --> 00:08:47.134 i think some people are mystified as to our 00:08:47.134 --> 00:08:49.774 approach there if you'll listen to 00:08:49.774 --> 00:08:52.954 the podcast they'll hear me say we've come 00:08:52.954 --> 00:08:55.614 across an investigation about a scam on the 00:08:55.614 --> 00:08:58.894 dark net yes i wanted to ask you about that you don't 00:08:58.894 --> 00:09:01.794 tell people the threat straight away no i don't 00:09:01.794 --> 00:09:04.774 but that is i promise you actually not entirely down 00:09:04.774 --> 00:09:07.654 to moaning competence so so that 00:09:07.654 --> 00:09:10.554 was actually deliberate and we were really 00:09:10.554 --> 00:09:14.334 worried when we were making these approaches that 00:09:14.334 --> 00:09:17.094 the person that put the person I was talking 00:09:17.094 --> 00:09:20.074 to on the kill list would be there right 00:09:20.074 --> 00:09:23.234 next to them we knew that it was 00:09:23.234 --> 00:09:26.174 quite likely that in in many of these cases the person 00:09:26.174 --> 00:09:30.254 would be quite close to the target in their lives spouse business 00:09:30.254 --> 00:09:33.194 partner former spouse family member even 00:09:33.194 --> 00:09:36.834 and I One of the real nightmare scenarios 00:09:36.834 --> 00:09:44.094 for me was to be delivering the warning and for the person that had put them 00:09:44.094 --> 00:09:51.174 on the kill list to be hearing that and realise that their window of opportunity 00:09:51.174 --> 00:09:53.774 was closing and kill him right there and then. 00:09:54.611 --> 00:09:58.211 And I thought that that was a definite possibility. 00:09:59.011 --> 00:10:05.511 So the reason... Let's reiterate, these are real threats to life. That is 100% real. 00:10:05.891 --> 00:10:09.151 100% real, yeah. I mean, you know, I'm telling, you know, I mean, 00:10:09.251 --> 00:10:11.891 the only thing that we know about these circumstances that we're stepping into 00:10:11.891 --> 00:10:13.951 is someone, we don't know who, 00:10:14.311 --> 00:10:18.071 has paid to have this person I'm talking to, sometimes paid 10, 00:10:18.251 --> 00:10:22.751 20, 30, 40, 50 thousand dollars worth to have them killed. 00:10:22.751 --> 00:10:26.091 So we know that someone somewhere in the shadows is lurking 00:10:26.091 --> 00:10:28.831 there with a with a definite will to have this 00:10:28.831 --> 00:10:32.031 person killed we know that um you know 00:10:32.031 --> 00:10:34.791 and so that's the reason why i am 00:10:34.791 --> 00:10:37.831 taking this kind of angular approach during these calls i what 00:10:37.831 --> 00:10:40.851 i'm actually trying to do is i'm trying to ascertain where this person 00:10:40.851 --> 00:10:43.731 is whether they're alone or not and i'm actually trying 00:10:43.731 --> 00:10:46.751 to set up another conversation that i was planning on having with them slightly 00:10:46.751 --> 00:10:49.651 down the road where they could choose when and where 00:10:49.651 --> 00:10:54.771 they could be somewhere they felt safe they could be somewhere where alone and 00:10:54.771 --> 00:10:58.131 then I was planning on actually delivering the news um obviously it didn't really 00:10:58.131 --> 00:11:02.431 transpire like that but um but that was the idea and of course I think it's 00:11:02.431 --> 00:11:06.611 fair to say you also worked with a clinical psychologist to try and navigate 00:11:06.611 --> 00:11:08.511 that ridiculously difficult, 00:11:09.751 --> 00:11:14.571 conversation um continuing on this of journalistic ethics now you point this 00:11:14.571 --> 00:11:17.291 out in the show and And every journalist listening to this will be sort of screaming, 00:11:17.671 --> 00:11:20.531 but you're a journalist, you can't get involved in these stories. 00:11:21.791 --> 00:11:25.771 That was a really hard thing for you to do because you're operating as a journalist 00:11:25.771 --> 00:11:32.311 and a researcher, yet you're actively having to get involved in the story you're reporting. Yeah. 00:11:33.195 --> 00:11:37.635 How did you navigate that? It was an explicit decision. 00:11:37.815 --> 00:11:42.815 It was one of the most difficult and important decisions I think we made during 00:11:42.815 --> 00:11:44.735 the investigation overall. 00:11:45.575 --> 00:11:50.615 And it obviously transported us into this quite uncertain and uncomfortable 00:11:50.615 --> 00:11:54.915 place where I think in the middle of all of this, I don't think we knew whether 00:11:54.915 --> 00:11:56.435 we were journalists anymore. 00:11:56.735 --> 00:11:59.535 I don't think we were vigilantes because we were 00:11:59.535 --> 00:12:02.635 trying to drag the 00:12:02.635 --> 00:12:06.315 police as much as possible but but we certainly weren't 00:12:06.315 --> 00:12:09.615 um doing the job of a conventional journalist 00:12:09.615 --> 00:12:12.455 no i think ultimately the reason 00:12:12.455 --> 00:12:15.115 that we stepped outside of the kind 00:12:15.115 --> 00:12:18.395 of mold of journalism or at least conventional journalism 00:12:18.395 --> 00:12:21.475 is because of the stakes involved yeah so 00:12:21.475 --> 00:12:24.495 these people were i thought 00:12:24.495 --> 00:12:27.935 in absolutely desperate danger like we 00:12:27.935 --> 00:12:30.895 knew that one of the people on the kill list way 00:12:30.895 --> 00:12:33.775 back in 2016 had been killed by the 00:12:33.775 --> 00:12:38.655 person that put her onto the site her husband um we 00:12:38.655 --> 00:12:44.255 knew or we were we were very afraid that the police in the various countries 00:12:44.255 --> 00:12:49.135 where this was happening was not going to take it seriously how did you found 00:12:49.135 --> 00:12:56.555 that because um we we had initially reported all of this to the Metropolitan Police. 00:12:57.835 --> 00:13:02.955 And Metropolitan Police had taken it seriously. They had... Yeah, 00:13:02.955 --> 00:13:07.115 I mean, this is... Again, I don't want to go too much into the story of it, 00:13:07.235 --> 00:13:10.395 but you did speak to the police. 00:13:10.775 --> 00:13:12.595 Yeah, it's the first thing I did, yeah. Correct. 00:13:13.095 --> 00:13:16.875 And in fact, even in the midst of the opening weeks of the pandemic, 00:13:17.075 --> 00:13:20.095 you had two Metropolitan Police officers turn up at your home. Yeah. 00:13:21.135 --> 00:13:25.615 Which is all rather odd to listen to and play out but yeah, 00:13:26.462 --> 00:13:32.162 It is difficult to navigate that boundary between researcher slash journalist 00:13:32.162 --> 00:13:35.702 and knowing that people's lives are really at risk. 00:13:35.882 --> 00:13:40.462 And you also employed and worked with journalists across the country, 00:13:40.802 --> 00:13:45.542 in various countries, to try and have people make contact in person. 00:13:46.022 --> 00:13:50.562 Again, given we're talking March, I mean, I'm up to episode four, 00:13:50.682 --> 00:13:53.862 so we're talking March 2020 to March, April 2021. 00:13:55.522 --> 00:13:58.642 How did you in practical terms get 00:13:58.642 --> 00:14:01.422 all that done well it 00:14:01.422 --> 00:14:04.342 was extremely difficult and obviously the fact that the whole world 00:14:04.342 --> 00:14:07.202 had locked down meant it was completely out of the question for me to actually 00:14:07.202 --> 00:14:12.382 physically go meet these people ourselves um that's why after all the cold calls 00:14:12.382 --> 00:14:17.202 had failed we actually decided that we were going to send local journalists 00:14:17.202 --> 00:14:21.702 to meet them we thought that was something less likely for a scammer to do it 00:14:21.702 --> 00:14:23.602 would provide a great opportunity for the, 00:14:24.082 --> 00:14:27.422 local journalists to be able to like size up the situation themselves to 00:14:27.422 --> 00:14:30.282 see whether they felt the situation was safe for 00:14:30.282 --> 00:14:33.102 me to deliver the news that i i wanted to deliver to them 00:14:33.102 --> 00:14:36.222 and actually then to be a kind of emotional support in 00:14:36.222 --> 00:14:38.982 the moment for that person and in the indeed in the days and 00:14:38.982 --> 00:14:42.002 weeks that followed so there was there was lots of reasons why we 00:14:42.002 --> 00:14:44.742 we began to kind of pivot towards that especially because the 00:14:44.742 --> 00:14:47.802 cold call simply weren't working um but then 00:14:47.802 --> 00:14:51.002 of course you know they they too kind. 00:14:51.002 --> 00:14:53.822 Of um are being asked to enter this 00:14:53.822 --> 00:14:57.362 place where we are intervening in people's lives kind 00:14:57.362 --> 00:15:00.582 of much more than you would ever really expect journalists 00:15:00.582 --> 00:15:03.282 to do and i just want to dwell on that point because i please especially to 00:15:03.282 --> 00:15:06.342 your audience charlotte i think it's a really important one um and 00:15:06.342 --> 00:15:09.462 and it was definitely definitely decision that that 00:15:09.462 --> 00:15:12.402 i don't think we we really wanted to make um and we 00:15:12.402 --> 00:15:15.182 didn't take lightly but but ultimately i just 00:15:15.182 --> 00:15:18.522 thing when we had determined that via the 00:15:18.522 --> 00:15:21.342 metropolitan police and via interpol and sorry 00:15:21.342 --> 00:15:24.182 this this was the point i wanted to make earlier the reason 00:15:24.182 --> 00:15:27.362 why we were convinced the police weren't going to investigate this 00:15:27.362 --> 00:15:30.162 seriously around the world was i'd gone 00:15:30.162 --> 00:15:33.082 to met the met the met had decided it was not their 00:15:33.082 --> 00:15:36.202 job to investigate you know understandably enough 00:15:36.202 --> 00:15:39.802 that to investigate all these cases around the world they 00:15:39.802 --> 00:15:42.802 had sent them on to interpol interpol then we 00:15:42.802 --> 00:15:45.502 understood was then passing on each case to 00:15:45.502 --> 00:15:48.542 each local force the problem with that 00:15:48.542 --> 00:15:51.702 is that that local force would have 00:15:51.702 --> 00:15:54.982 number one had no idea who we were no way 00:15:54.982 --> 00:15:57.762 of asking us a question and no way of 00:15:57.762 --> 00:16:01.842 being of us being able to reach them with any updates we couldn't reach them 00:16:01.842 --> 00:16:05.442 with the payment information we couldn't update them on new messages we were 00:16:05.442 --> 00:16:09.562 intercepting and we were intercepting messages all the time you know every day 00:16:09.562 --> 00:16:13.402 there was like new updates into all of these different kill orders And sometimes 00:16:13.402 --> 00:16:16.582 the money would go up, the urgency would go up as it did in the Swiss case. 00:16:17.370 --> 00:16:22.110 And so given that, given that Interpol was kind of sitting between us and the 00:16:22.110 --> 00:16:28.030 local police departments, and we knew from kind of previous historical work that had been done, 00:16:28.330 --> 00:16:32.790 in some cases, when warnings like that had been issued in the past, 00:16:32.950 --> 00:16:37.430 that the target had no idea, was never in fact reached by the police in any way. 00:16:38.110 --> 00:16:41.170 All of that together convinced us that 00:16:41.170 --> 00:16:43.910 that we couldn't just we couldn't just sit 00:16:43.910 --> 00:16:46.650 back and think that the job was done and that these 00:16:46.650 --> 00:16:49.570 people's lives still were in all likelihood in danger 00:16:49.570 --> 00:16:52.810 and that there was also a uh a 00:16:52.810 --> 00:16:55.830 significant possibility that they hadn't been warned or at least weren't being 00:16:55.830 --> 00:16:59.090 warned in the right way or in a way that would be effective you know 00:16:59.090 --> 00:17:03.110 and help keep them safe so so that was why we decided 00:17:03.110 --> 00:17:06.630 the only way really that we could um do 00:17:06.630 --> 00:17:09.750 our best to make sure that they were safe or do everything we could to make 00:17:09.750 --> 00:17:13.450 sure they were safe was to reach them ourselves in in the safest way that we 00:17:13.450 --> 00:17:17.210 could in the most sensitive way that we could um but as soon as you start doing 00:17:17.210 --> 00:17:20.250 that of course you really are stepping outside of the role of journalists because 00:17:20.250 --> 00:17:24.010 then you begin to know these people i mean you begin to care about them of course yeah, 00:17:24.470 --> 00:17:28.490 you develop long-term relationships with them and i was i was invited into to 00:17:28.490 --> 00:17:31.570 one of the person's weddings that was on the campus. 00:17:32.910 --> 00:17:37.290 Yeah, I mean, I can hear this as you play back the conversations you have with 00:17:37.290 --> 00:17:41.970 a lot of the potential victims, that you are building a relationship with them. 00:17:43.450 --> 00:17:47.650 You can't help but not to. They're human beings, and they're human beings that 00:17:47.650 --> 00:17:50.690 are going through one of the hardest times of their lives. 00:17:51.210 --> 00:17:54.270 And you're one of the small number of people in the world, maybe the only person 00:17:54.270 --> 00:17:57.950 or the only group in the world that actually understands what they're going through. 00:17:58.290 --> 00:18:01.690 You know, I think it's really hard not to develop some kind of, 00:18:01.790 --> 00:18:08.390 you know, just basic human sympathy for them and all the uncertainty and the 00:18:08.390 --> 00:18:12.970 unsafety and pain that they're experiencing. And of course you want to try and help them. 00:18:14.270 --> 00:18:18.190 Did you ever feel that conflict though? Or was it very clear to you, 00:18:18.570 --> 00:18:22.110 no, these people's lives are potentially in danger, I have to do something? 00:18:22.350 --> 00:18:27.110 Did you feel that? The journalist Carl and human Carl, Did you feel them in conflict? 00:18:27.610 --> 00:18:32.630 No, I didn't. I think it was I think we made this decision very early on and 00:18:32.630 --> 00:18:33.370 pretty much immediately. 00:18:33.430 --> 00:18:38.170 It was clear to me that when people's lives were in danger, that was what you basically had to do. 00:18:38.170 --> 00:18:43.090 It was much more we made that decision and then that transported us into this 00:18:43.090 --> 00:18:45.590 quite uncertain and uncomfortable, 00:18:46.130 --> 00:18:51.490 liminal kind of space where we didn't really have any, you know, 00:18:51.790 --> 00:18:58.490 really obvious like framework or professional identity to guide us, you know. 00:18:59.290 --> 00:19:04.450 But it was there wasn't, I think, any kind of prospect of us not deciding to 00:19:04.450 --> 00:19:07.550 do what we did in the end. I think I think it was obvious to us we needed to step in. 00:19:08.170 --> 00:19:13.230 And how did you go about recruiting the various local journalists? 00:19:14.435 --> 00:19:18.995 It was a network. It wasn't actually me. It was extremely hard work of the team 00:19:18.995 --> 00:19:22.295 of producers, including Caroline and others at Novel. 00:19:23.035 --> 00:19:27.355 But they were using various, scrabbling together, I think, any kind of like 00:19:27.355 --> 00:19:32.155 freelance journalist networks that we could kind of find in any of these countries, 00:19:32.495 --> 00:19:35.035 whether they were kind of stringers or local reporters. 00:19:35.995 --> 00:19:41.195 And we would then find someone. Obviously, it was COVID. So quite a lot of people 00:19:41.195 --> 00:19:45.115 weren't really working a huge amount at that point, which probably probably 00:19:45.115 --> 00:19:46.975 was worked in our favour a little bit. 00:19:47.395 --> 00:19:51.535 And then when we found someone, we would then horridly brief them. 00:19:51.935 --> 00:19:55.835 Remember, all of this is happening in the kind of the greatest, 00:19:56.495 --> 00:19:58.655 most utmost urgency that you can imagine. 00:19:58.795 --> 00:20:01.415 Like each one of these cases, like we also don't have a lot of time. 00:20:01.415 --> 00:20:06.015 So we're having to move just about as quickly as we possibly can in order to set all of this up. 00:20:06.015 --> 00:20:09.955 So that we can be having that local journalist actually out there and trying 00:20:09.955 --> 00:20:14.295 to kind of strategise, like, the right way of reaching the target. Yes. 00:20:15.195 --> 00:20:19.135 And again, the pandemic makes everything harder and you worked. 00:20:19.335 --> 00:20:24.655 Were you working on a podcast first? Because the show, it obviously all starts 00:20:24.655 --> 00:20:28.695 with you already with your podcast set up, conversations being recorded and so on. 00:20:28.835 --> 00:20:32.455 What were you working on as you stumbled onto this list? we were supposed to 00:20:32.455 --> 00:20:37.875 be doing a podcast in into the um a retrospective of these markets, 00:20:38.375 --> 00:20:42.515 so it was supposed to be the last two years and we you know uh and everything 00:20:42.515 --> 00:20:47.015 would be in the past it was supposed to be done and dusted in in uh in six weeks 00:20:47.015 --> 00:20:49.275 and here we are four years later. 00:20:50.175 --> 00:20:52.595 Yes uh it's fascinating um, 00:20:53.424 --> 00:20:56.924 Yeah, there's another element. I should have probably asked you this at the beginning. 00:20:56.984 --> 00:21:03.104 But there's an element, you mentioned it, but I found it disturbing as I was listening to it. 00:21:03.264 --> 00:21:06.144 How many of the potential victims were women? 00:21:06.524 --> 00:21:13.124 As you're going through the list, the majority of cases, I can tell, 00:21:13.364 --> 00:21:17.124 seem to be people trying to hurt and kill women, 00:21:17.604 --> 00:21:21.604 which you say yourself brings another dynamic to it. 00:21:21.604 --> 00:21:24.204 100 yeah so if you 00:21:24.204 --> 00:21:27.644 look at the um well best just 00:21:27.644 --> 00:21:30.444 to fill people in probably one more step um before 00:21:30.444 --> 00:21:36.944 we get to the big picture so we're scrambling around we are sending out local 00:21:36.944 --> 00:21:43.864 reporters the investigation is really struggling to scale um we're up kind of 00:21:43.864 --> 00:21:47.764 um all times of the day and night in all these different cases around the world 00:21:47.764 --> 00:21:50.144 in australia and the united states as 00:21:50.324 --> 00:21:54.264 europe and then in a kind 00:21:54.264 --> 00:22:02.084 of really important um kind of uh new kind of kind of pivot the fbi get involved 00:22:02.084 --> 00:22:06.544 which is just where i've got to just where you've got to charlotte and and and 00:22:06.544 --> 00:22:08.124 the fbi really changes the game 00:22:08.124 --> 00:22:13.804 for us so once we once we kind of can demonstrate to the fbi that that the. 00:22:14.864 --> 00:22:18.224 Information we're providing is legit suddenly you 00:22:18.224 --> 00:22:21.204 know the number of investigations and the number of convictions 00:22:21.204 --> 00:22:25.684 really starts going up and it goes from one to two to four to ten and it reaches 00:22:25.684 --> 00:22:31.964 we now have 28 and it's largely that that we can draw now we're trying to step 00:22:31.964 --> 00:22:36.684 back it's it's still a small portion i would say i mean we made 175 threat to 00:22:36.684 --> 00:22:38.644 life disclosures over the course of the investigation. 00:22:39.024 --> 00:22:45.804 So, you know, plenty of cases that haven't been resolved yet. 00:22:47.582 --> 00:22:50.662 Yeah, I mean, when you step back and you look at the convictions, 00:22:50.662 --> 00:22:58.922 it's definitely obvious that there's a really strong gendered element. 00:22:59.702 --> 00:23:03.862 There's many more male perpetrators and female. 00:23:06.222 --> 00:23:14.122 But regardless of the gender of the perpetrator, almost every case is targeting 00:23:14.122 --> 00:23:15.402 someone of the other gender. 00:23:15.882 --> 00:23:19.142 Oh, that's interesting. it's it's women targeting men 00:23:19.142 --> 00:23:22.182 it's men targeting women there's almost 00:23:22.182 --> 00:23:25.202 no women targeting women and there's almost no men targeting 00:23:25.202 --> 00:23:28.342 men interestingly enough and that's because i think 00:23:28.342 --> 00:23:31.502 about 80 percent of the of the cases where that's happening 00:23:31.502 --> 00:23:34.442 where the case is going across gender is a is one 00:23:34.442 --> 00:23:37.802 of um intimate partner violence and almost 00:23:37.802 --> 00:23:40.842 all of them are coming out of conditions of like coercive control 00:23:40.842 --> 00:23:44.722 normally it's about control and normally the perpetrators 00:23:44.722 --> 00:23:48.522 feeling in one way or another control slipping and 00:23:48.522 --> 00:23:52.502 there's a lot of messy divorces and things as well divorces 00:23:52.502 --> 00:23:56.642 um adoption cases um people 00:23:56.642 --> 00:24:00.902 trying to flee the house um yes 00:24:00.902 --> 00:24:04.442 um you sometimes there's 00:24:04.442 --> 00:24:07.702 money tangled in there as well maybe um you 00:24:07.702 --> 00:24:10.482 know money at stake during the divorce but but yeah very 00:24:10.482 --> 00:24:13.682 very often it's basically control of either a 00:24:13.682 --> 00:24:16.902 person or of a relationship as a 00:24:16.902 --> 00:24:20.722 male journalist dealing with these often female victims 00:24:20.722 --> 00:24:24.682 were you conscious of that were you because you do use a lot of a lot of the 00:24:24.682 --> 00:24:28.902 journals in the other countries i've noticed so far are women yeah um so it 00:24:28.902 --> 00:24:32.382 which i think does help you know a woman making contact with another woman to 00:24:32.382 --> 00:24:37.342 explain the threat um but ultimately it's you that delivers the news do you. 00:24:38.122 --> 00:24:40.042 Were you conscious of that as well? 00:24:40.402 --> 00:24:45.782 Yeah, I was really conscious of it. I think at the time, at least initially, 00:24:46.522 --> 00:24:49.382 it was all so breathless and so scary. 00:24:50.013 --> 00:24:54.773 It was the big the bigger picture that there was this really kind of strong 00:24:54.773 --> 00:24:58.813 gender dimension, like really only emerged, I would say reasonably slowly, 00:24:58.813 --> 00:25:01.933 because remember, we're kind of notifying people. 00:25:02.453 --> 00:25:07.173 But then it's quite a long it's often quite a long time before we get the resolution of the case. 00:25:07.493 --> 00:25:12.873 Yeah. In some cases, actually, it was the the the person was completely wrong 00:25:12.873 --> 00:25:14.013 about who put them on the list. 00:25:14.973 --> 00:25:18.253 So there was one case where the um 00:25:18.253 --> 00:25:21.533 target was absolutely convinced that it 00:25:21.533 --> 00:25:24.533 was the family of her husband and it turned out to be something completely different 00:25:24.533 --> 00:25:27.313 yeah yeah um and and that happened 00:25:27.313 --> 00:25:31.793 quite a lot so you know and in in many other cases actually they they weren't 00:25:31.793 --> 00:25:35.753 sure who it might be i mean it genuinely came out of the blue so i think it 00:25:35.753 --> 00:25:41.313 took a while it wasn't immediately apparent that that so many uh of the cases 00:25:41.313 --> 00:25:44.233 were to do with intimate partner violence But as it did emerge, 00:25:44.253 --> 00:25:46.353 you know, by case five and case six, 00:25:46.633 --> 00:25:56.733 it became it became really apparent that that we should be using female journalists 00:25:56.733 --> 00:26:03.513 whenever possible when we're delivering news related to a female target. 00:26:03.793 --> 00:26:08.473 Yeah. And that was very likely to create circumstances which would be more kind 00:26:08.473 --> 00:26:12.693 of supportive and and and slightly less threatening. Yeah, and build trust. 00:26:13.273 --> 00:26:17.013 You talk, as the podcast goes on, you talk about the effect on yourself. 00:26:17.233 --> 00:26:22.253 You talk about laying awake at night worrying and the toll it took on you. 00:26:23.033 --> 00:26:24.833 How did you work through that? 00:26:26.571 --> 00:26:31.071 Well, I'm not sure we have entirely, if I'm honest. Time, I suppose. 00:26:31.351 --> 00:26:35.431 I mean, you know, we're not the victims here, but it was it was quite traumatising. 00:26:35.671 --> 00:26:39.291 I mean, I can hear as I'm listening. It clearly is taking a toll on you. 00:26:39.891 --> 00:26:44.571 Yeah, I mean, it's a really, really unpleasant responsibility to hold. 00:26:44.711 --> 00:26:48.851 I mean, you are worrying about these targets on the kill list all the time. 00:26:48.851 --> 00:26:51.491 And um every time you're kind 00:26:51.491 --> 00:26:55.031 of sending a local journalist into a context you just 00:26:55.031 --> 00:26:58.191 are so worried about what's going to happen and you're 00:26:58.191 --> 00:27:01.791 so worried about making the wrong kind of decision we're 00:27:01.791 --> 00:27:04.831 really worried that even our interventions might in some cases 00:27:04.831 --> 00:27:07.651 make the situation much more 00:27:07.651 --> 00:27:10.811 unstable lead to someone doing something um 00:27:10.811 --> 00:27:13.931 uh something irreversible so yeah 00:27:13.931 --> 00:27:16.831 it was um it was it was you know and and 00:27:16.831 --> 00:27:19.631 once again like me caroline everyone working on this like when 00:27:19.631 --> 00:27:23.091 we weren't really hardened crime journalists this isn't our beat this isn't 00:27:23.091 --> 00:27:26.811 the kind of thing that we know how to do very well um or that we were used to 00:27:26.811 --> 00:27:32.451 doing um i think the and i don't think i did deal with it for quite a long time 00:27:32.451 --> 00:27:38.431 um i think uh it really uh it was really only as um. 00:27:38.911 --> 00:27:42.071 We had years to deal with this i think we began to 00:27:42.071 --> 00:27:45.211 learn how we could do this in the way which made it more sustainable for ourselves 00:27:45.211 --> 00:27:48.271 were you ever threatened about 00:27:48.271 --> 00:27:52.991 worried about threats to you in your own life no you 00:27:52.991 --> 00:27:55.991 never thought that as people worked out you were digging into this there could 00:27:55.991 --> 00:28:01.311 be a threat against you um i mean i don't think so uh it's not really something 00:28:01.311 --> 00:28:06.231 that i found to be a useful question to dwell upon if i'm honest good well we 00:28:06.231 --> 00:28:09.191 won't dwell upon it then But as I was listening to it, 00:28:09.211 --> 00:28:14.751 I couldn't help be worrying about your safety as well, because I think certainly 00:28:14.751 --> 00:28:17.511 if it was me, that would be one of the things I was worried about. 00:28:17.971 --> 00:28:23.451 I guess there was the reassurance that you knew at least the Hitman site itself 00:28:23.451 --> 00:28:25.931 had this scam element to it. 00:28:27.301 --> 00:28:32.621 Yes. I mean, it's not something I could do anything about. It's not something 00:28:32.621 --> 00:28:33.901 that I try and worry about. 00:28:34.901 --> 00:28:40.461 I think that anyone listening to this would have done the same thing as us. 00:28:40.701 --> 00:28:44.261 You know, I think human beings generally are good and we try and help each other. 00:28:44.261 --> 00:28:47.281 And when you really are faced with the prospect that you're the, 00:28:47.281 --> 00:28:51.621 you know, you're you're the only group that knows of these kind of, 00:28:51.701 --> 00:28:55.461 you know, desperately dangerous threats to life, 00:28:55.781 --> 00:28:59.921 like you have to act and you have to just deal with the consequences of that. 00:29:01.001 --> 00:29:03.781 Um you know this is a story that i 00:29:03.781 --> 00:29:07.101 hope i never have to do anything like this ever again uh you 00:29:07.101 --> 00:29:11.901 know it's it's not something i would wish upon people when it's not a responsibility 00:29:11.901 --> 00:29:17.201 that i relished having if i'm honest with you um i would kind of rather if the 00:29:17.201 --> 00:29:21.701 police have just picked this up in 2020 and we could have stepped away and done 00:29:21.701 --> 00:29:25.361 something else but but here we go you know And we're just going to have to live 00:29:25.361 --> 00:29:27.021 with the consequences of what we did now. 00:29:27.741 --> 00:29:33.861 Yeah. And well, one of the things, it really is an amazingly put together show. 00:29:34.861 --> 00:29:39.301 It's like there's all these jokes about kind of true crime and whatever people 00:29:39.301 --> 00:29:41.121 obsess with true crime podcasts. 00:29:42.221 --> 00:29:48.641 But this the way you put the story all together and the producers you work with 00:29:48.641 --> 00:29:50.861 put the story all together really is brilliant. 00:29:50.861 --> 00:29:54.161 Brilliant you must have been so pleased when you sort of started hearing the 00:29:54.161 --> 00:30:01.861 final product and how did you go about trying to tell this story because frankly carl it's mad. 00:30:03.481 --> 00:30:06.381 Well i mean so just a huge shout out to 00:30:06.381 --> 00:30:09.221 you know to all the novel people that worked on 00:30:09.221 --> 00:30:12.481 this you know there was there was this is although 00:30:12.481 --> 00:30:15.501 it's my voice you know as ever all the journalists listening to 00:30:15.501 --> 00:30:18.441 this will know but the kind of the team that that's 00:30:18.441 --> 00:30:21.721 actually needed to pull together something like kill 00:30:21.721 --> 00:30:24.681 list is massive you know there's dozens of people 00:30:24.681 --> 00:30:27.441 worrying about the soundscape and worrying about how it 00:30:27.441 --> 00:30:30.561 sounds and do the editing and doing the fact checking and they're all absolutely 00:30:30.561 --> 00:30:33.961 brilliant um and what i think they did brilliantly 00:30:33.961 --> 00:30:37.141 well that i was so so pleased about when we began 00:30:37.141 --> 00:30:41.141 to hear began to hear the kind of mixtapes is i 00:30:41.141 --> 00:30:44.201 think they've like threaded this needle i mean 00:30:44.201 --> 00:30:47.081 i would say this but i genuinely i truly think this is true and they 00:30:47.081 --> 00:30:50.661 threaded this needle where where it sounds like 00:30:50.661 --> 00:30:53.701 so epic and exciting and 00:30:53.701 --> 00:30:56.741 suspenseful without falling to 00:30:56.741 --> 00:31:00.461 the kind of pitfalls of being overblown 00:31:00.461 --> 00:31:11.961 or um salacious you know and i i never wanted this series to be about um delighting 00:31:11.961 --> 00:31:17.521 or or even necessarily dwelling over the kind of pain that people are going through. 00:31:18.272 --> 00:31:24.692 Um you know uh and you know i think as one reviewer said we managed to do it without leering 00:31:25.132 --> 00:31:28.172 and i'm very proud of that and i'm i agree with that yeah 00:31:28.172 --> 00:31:31.192 have any of the potential victims 00:31:31.192 --> 00:31:33.952 on the kill list heard it have they told you anything what they 00:31:33.952 --> 00:31:36.952 think of it they have yeah they they've all 00:31:36.952 --> 00:31:40.352 heard their own involvements in it and um 00:31:40.352 --> 00:31:43.332 uh many of them i know have listened to the uh 00:31:43.332 --> 00:31:46.372 to the full thing um and yeah i'm 00:31:46.372 --> 00:31:49.292 pleased to say that so far all i've heard is 00:31:49.292 --> 00:31:52.152 is is that they i think one of the things they've told 00:31:52.152 --> 00:31:55.432 us they didn't know how hard it was for us at the time uh because 00:31:55.432 --> 00:31:58.472 they only heard you know they were only talking to us about their reach 00:31:58.472 --> 00:32:01.392 about their specific case most interestingly we've 00:32:01.392 --> 00:32:04.452 had people that um are on the kill list 00:32:04.452 --> 00:32:07.852 who we couldn't convince uh uh 00:32:07.852 --> 00:32:10.952 that uh they were on it so that the the we 00:32:10.952 --> 00:32:13.892 failed to properly warn or at 00:32:13.892 --> 00:32:17.452 least warn in a way that they actually found convincing they have some of those 00:32:17.452 --> 00:32:20.912 have actually subsequently reached out to us for information about their own 00:32:20.912 --> 00:32:25.392 cases so that's that and i was always hoping that that might be the case you 00:32:25.392 --> 00:32:31.392 know that yeah that they might uh um that they might hear this and And then, you know, 00:32:31.732 --> 00:32:34.112 finally know that this is all real. 00:32:34.672 --> 00:32:39.752 Yeah. Now we've got these 18 episodes. Do you feel that you as a journalist 00:32:39.752 --> 00:32:44.392 and researcher can step away from the story a bit now that it's out there? Yes. 00:32:45.495 --> 00:32:50.575 There's a bit of a, finally, after what is nearly five years, 00:32:50.835 --> 00:32:55.975 you feel able to draw a line under this quite traumatic story for a journalist 00:32:55.975 --> 00:32:58.235 to have to report out. Yeah, I do. 00:32:58.975 --> 00:33:03.095 I feel like I feel like I can I can step away from this. 00:33:04.095 --> 00:33:09.415 It's something that has been part of my life for so many years. 00:33:11.455 --> 00:33:14.755 And thank God now we don't hold the kill list. 00:33:14.755 --> 00:33:18.435 The killer still exists these sites still exist i 00:33:18.435 --> 00:33:21.635 believe they're still being used we can see convictions 00:33:21.635 --> 00:33:24.455 coming out from them still but we do not 00:33:24.455 --> 00:33:28.195 sit in the middle of them anymore it's not our responsibility uh and 00:33:28.195 --> 00:33:31.875 and yes i i i certainly feel like 00:33:31.875 --> 00:33:34.635 i can step away from this finally after all 00:33:34.635 --> 00:33:37.855 this time um uh without feeling 00:33:37.855 --> 00:33:40.615 that this is uh that the story is unfinished or at 00:33:40.615 --> 00:33:44.155 least my part of this story is unfinished well i'm 00:33:44.155 --> 00:33:47.015 i found it absolutely gripping i totally agree 00:33:47.015 --> 00:33:50.055 that you've told the story in this way that's 00:33:50.055 --> 00:33:53.895 you know engaging but also respectful and 00:33:53.895 --> 00:33:57.175 i can't wait to listen to more episodes um carmela 00:33:57.175 --> 00:33:59.835 thank you so much for joining me tell people where they can keep up with your 00:33:59.835 --> 00:34:03.015 work obviously they know they can find kill list wherever they 00:34:03.015 --> 00:34:05.775 listen to their podcast as the saying goes but where else can they 00:34:05.775 --> 00:34:08.455 find you they can what if they did i'm not 00:34:08.455 --> 00:34:11.655 hard to find uh and i've had uh i've loved 00:34:11.655 --> 00:34:14.495 hearing from people that have listened to killed it so far so 00:34:14.495 --> 00:34:18.515 just google me uh or carlmiller.co uh 00:34:18.515 --> 00:34:21.935 for the website um you can reach me there and let 00:34:21.935 --> 00:34:25.195 me know what you think fantastic um i should plug 00:34:25.195 --> 00:34:27.835 because i'm nice that it's on wondering plus as well so you can. 00:34:27.835 --> 00:34:31.395 Pay to binge it can't you indeed uh but 00:34:31.395 --> 00:34:34.295 or you can be a cheapskate like me and listen to it through apple 00:34:34.295 --> 00:34:37.435 podcast whenever it comes out but yeah it's it's a really fantastic 00:34:37.435 --> 00:34:40.055 gripping show I think one of the 00:34:40.055 --> 00:34:42.655 best of its kind I genuinely mean that not just because you're sitting on the 00:34:42.655 --> 00:34:45.575 other side of the screen I'm at 00:34:45.575 --> 00:34:48.835 Charlotte A Henry across social media obviously if 00:34:48.835 --> 00:34:51.635 you're listening you know that this is the edition podcast where you 00:34:51.635 --> 00:34:54.695 can listen wherever you get your podcasts and you can 00:34:54.695 --> 00:34:57.615 head over to the edition.net to get blog posts 00:34:57.615 --> 00:35:00.355 newsletters and other podcast episodes you can 00:35:00.355 --> 00:35:04.495 take out your subscription to the newsletter which means you get the full thing 00:35:04.495 --> 00:35:09.535 twice a week for a mere five pound a month 50 quid for the year and it means 00:35:09.535 --> 00:35:14.195 I can keep doing all this kind of thing and I really appreciate it so thank 00:35:14.195 --> 00:35:17.735 you again Carl for joining me thank you all for listening and I'll see you next week. 00:35:18.320 --> 00:35:26.825 Music.